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JAMES LANDIS: 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS* 
Charles H. Koch, Jr. * * 
J ames Landis knew how to make human organizations work. 1 His successes ranged from establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
to cleaning Harvard Law School to reviving the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) 
to stabilizing our wartime relations in the Middle East. At Harvard, he was a 
popular and innovative dean for whom the school made every accommodation 
in order to keep him. 2 At the OCD, he was credited with cleaning up "the 
worst of all Washington's administrative messes. " 3 Of his work at the SEC, 
his successor as chair, William Douglas, said "Jim ... taught us how to get 
things done. " 4 
In 1938, he took great care in the prestigious Yale Storrs Lectures over the 
working of the administrative process. These lectures justified the resort to 
that process and demonstrated its potential for solving the problems of modern 
government. Fittingly, when it was published, it was titled simply The Administra-
tive Process. 
As we acknowledge the 50-year regime of the extraordinary Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA), it seems important that we review this work for 
its practical insights and, unfortunately, for its misplaced optimism. Our re-
hearsal of the justification for our resort to government ("the administrative" 
as Landis called it) is made more urgent by the current attack on many of that 
process' innovations. Practical and cost-effective government is the theme of 
Landis's work. Even those who seek a more limited government should study 
• James M. Landis, The Administrative Process, Yale University Press, 1938. 160 pp. $2.00 (the 
price at the time of publication). 
•• Woodbridge Professor of Law, College of William and Mary School of Law; B.A. 1966, 
University of Maryland; J.D. 1969, George Washington University; LL M. 1975, University of 
Chicago. 
1. See jAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss (Greenwood Press 1974 (1938)); DoN· 
ALD A. RITCHIE, jAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS (1980). 
2. When Roosevelt asked him to come to Washington in 1942, one of the few "New Deal 
lawyers" called when things actually needed to get done, Landis was given a leave of absence. 
RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 103. "At the law school other professors were delighted that Landis had 
only asked for a leave instead of resigning outright, a possibility they considered a 'calamity.' " 
/d. at 106. He was also highly regarded as a teacher and was liked and respected by students. 
3. /d. at 115. 
4. /d. at 77. 
420 48 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 419 
his insights. Whatever government we are to have, it should be carried out 
most effectively at the lowest possible cost. 
In many ways, of course, we are witnessing the continuation of the long war 
that was in another particularly heated stage in Landis's time. 5 The 1938 Storrs 
Lectures themselves were in part a response to a report from Roosevelt's Com-
mittee on Administrative Management, under Louis Brownlow. That report 
denounced the bureaucracy as a "headless fourth branch. " 6 Landis's nemesis, 
former Harvard Dean Roscoe Pound, termed the growing administrative process 
"marxist. " 7 Landis himself was considered quite "pink" in certain quarters. 8 
Far from challenging our basic principles of government, however, Landis 
saw the administrative process as a necessary modernizing affirmation of those 
principles. 9 Indeed, his commitment to the market resulted in the only "failure" 
he suffered as an administrator. 10 His tenure at the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) ended in a dismissal caused by an industry afraid of competition. In 
the middle of the century, American industry had apparently become quite 
envious of German "industrial socialism," the close partnership of government 
and industry. That relationship was enhanced here during the war through 
"dollar-a-year men." 11 The airline industry saw the CAB as its guarantee of 
government-sponsored monopoly. When Landis attempted to inject the competi-
tion that Alfred Kahn ultimately proved so worthy, the industry harassed an 
embattled president into dismissing him despite enthusiastic support from small 
5. The first federal independent regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
was created in 1887. 
6. RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 85. 
7. Kenneth C. Davis & Walter Gellhorn, Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 
38 ADMIN. L. REv. 511, 512 (1986) (statement of Paul R. Verkuil). 
8. RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 108. 
9. "!have always considered that my work with the Government was to try to make administra-
tive regulation sufficiently effective so as to enable capitalism to live up to its own pretensions." 
/d. at 176. 
10. This is a good place to confront his personal "failures." (These are blamed on a dominating 
father, who was actually much loved by his community, coworkers, and family including his son. 
/d. at 7-8.) In fact, he seemed to have been a reasonably good husband, father, friend, and human 
for a busy man in a busy time. Landis's divorce was so difficult because his wife loved him deeply 
and continued to do so. /d. at 135-36. He was good to his children although he did not spend 
much time with them. /d. at 90-91, 193-94. His trouble with the government began a series of 
events that seemed to confirm a belief (that we harbor about such people) that he was a closet 
freak. In reality, it turned out to be no more than extreme sloppiness and bad luck. Later psychologi-
cal analysis showed Landis to be, not surprisingly, a driven personality, seeking affirmation. /d. 
at 196-97. He was not an alcoholic, though he drank too much, and autopsy showed that he died 
of a heart attack, not a depression-driven suicide. Still, his personal life, which would hardly be 
considered "colorful" today, so overshadowed our view of his public performance that Peter Irons 
could sum up the latter with the epithet "during his troubled career as a regulator, corporate 
lawyer, and law school professor and dean." PETER H. IRONS, THE NEw DEAL LAWYERS 296 (1982). 
On the contrary, there can be no doubt that his career was extraordinary; it was perhaps sometimes 
turbulent as a result of its energy and dedication, but it was not "troubled." 
II. Corporate America loaned executives to the wartime government and paid their salaries. 
Truman, who made his national reputation rooting out wartime profiteering and fraud as chair 
of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, distrusted the partner-
ship this practice created. DAVID McCuLLOUCH, TRUMAN 278 (1992). 
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airlines, pilot and labor organizations, and the public. 12 Here, he was a victim 
of his own administrative success and policy foresight. 13 
Throughout his career then he made government work. In The Administrative 
Process, he tried to explain how government can be made to work. His success 
demonstrated two threads that run throughout The Administrative Process: its faith-
fulness to an American approach to social problems and its overarching organiza-
tional pragmatism. Landis was an early, if moderate, believer in "legal real-
ism." He continually sought to enhance our foundational principles by making 
them work. Because we so urgently need to revitalize this approach to procedural 
theory, this books speaks to us today as much as it did in the formative years 
of the administrative process. 
He described innovations made possible by the administrative process in three 
major areas. First, his separation of powers discussion may have had the most 
effect on the AP A because he demonstrated that the administrative process 
strengthened, rather than diminished, the foundational concept of separation 
of powers. Second, he outlined the advantages of the administrative process 
over the judicial process. Third, his development of the concept of administrative 
lawmaking may have had the most impact on the future of administrative law. 
In all of these, he followed an eclecticism that has been more readily found in 
administrative law than in the other legal disciplines, just now reluctantly being 
drawn into "globalization." 14 
I. Separation of Powers and the Bureaucracy 
The book's view of separation of powers informed the final APA. 15 Landis 
challenged the pedigree of this doctrine. He points out that it "has distinctly 
American flavor" and is not, as is often asserted, derived from fundamental 
principles of freedom. 16 He recognized that all parliamentary governments, some 
of which are deemed free, combine the legislative and the executive. In fact, 
12. RITCHIE, supra note I, at 154. 
13. Here again his organizational success was impressive, and he left a much stronger agency 
than he found. !d. at 155. 
14. Dating back to the first American administrative law scholar. FRANK GooDNOW, COMPARA-
TIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS NATIONAL AND LocAL, oF 
THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY 20 (1893). 
15. Allen Moore, The Proposed Administrative Procedure Act, in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 327, 327-28 (79th Congress ed., 1946). 
16. LANDIS, supra note I, at I. Here, the name of the early eighteenth century observer, Baron 
Montesquieu, invokes mystical powers and yet in other respects much of his work seems contrary 
to modern principles. We might note, for example, that he observed that moving into the southern 
climates "we fancy ourselves entirely removed from the verge of morality; here the strongest passions 
are productive of all manners of crimes .... [T]here is no curiosity, no enterprise, no generosity 
of sentiment; the inclinations are all passive; indolence constitutes the utmost of happiness. " 
CHARLES LoUis DE SEcoNDAT, BARON DE MoNTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 224 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing Co. 1966) (1748). 
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it has long been accepted by practical people that wooden adherence to this 
doctrine cannot work. 17 
Still, he does not challenge the general advisability of separating, as well as 
coordinating, the three traditional functions of government. He observed: 
If the doctrine of the separation of power implies division, it also implies balance, 
and balance calls for equality. The creation of administrative power may be the means 
for the preservation of that balance, so that paradoxically enough, though it may 
seem in theoretic violation of the doctrine of the separation of power, it may in matter 
of fact be the means for the preservation of the content of that doctrine. 18 
A. MoDERNIZING THE SEPARATION oF PowERS DocTRINE 
Landis saw the administrative process as both faithful to the doctrine and an 
instrument for its modernization. "In terms of political theory, the administra-
tive process springs from the inadequacy of a simply tripartite form of govern-
ment to deal with modern problems." 19 Thus, agencies were created with func-
tions that ''embraced the three aspects of government.' ' 20 
Opposing the perpetuation of the archaic tripartite concept that condemned 
the "administrative" as an unconstitutional fourth branch, he would incorporate 
this institution into the mechanisms of modern government. 21 This grouping 
encompasses the entire bureaucracy, executive as well as independent agencies. 
This bureaucracy deals with all the constitutional branches as if a distinct institu-
tion of government. Hence, Landis observed: "It is the relationships of the 
admi!1istrative to the three departments of government that are important. " 22 
B. LIMITS oN THE DELEGATION oF PowERS 
The application of the separation of powers doctrine known as the "nondelega-
tion" doctrine is not important in Landis's view, and had by the turn of the 
century "retired from the field. " 23 Delegation, as we know, was then on the 
rise. 24 Practical pressure then, as now, defeated the doctrine's ability to limit 
these delegations. 
Now, as in Landis's time, we need to recognize that the quality of the delega-
tion is most important. Landis urged that "the grant of the power to regulate 
1 7. ''Modern [late nineteenth century I political science has ... generally discarded this theory 
both because it is incapable of accurate statement, and because it seems to be impossible to apply 
it with beneficial results in the formation of any concrete political organization." GooDNOW, supra 
note 14, at 20. 
18. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 46. 
19. /d. at 1. 
20. /d. at 2. 
21. This debate remains current as the Supreme Court increasingly takes a wooden approach. 
E.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). 
22. LANDIS, supra note I, at 88. Indeed, it is the conflicts between executive agencies and the 
executive office of the president that have been most controversial today. E.g., Allan B. Morrison, 
OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 
1059, 1066 (1986). 
23. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 50 (quoting a 1916 statement by Elihu Root). 
24. /d. at 68. 
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must specify not only the subject matter of regulation but also the end which 
regulation seeks to attain. " 25 If these ends are clear, Landis found immaterial 
"[t]hat the standards as written into the legislation are broad and vague." 26 
Other factors necessarily limit the authority of the agency. Factual context 
in which the delegation is to operate will limit discretion. 27 Also, specialization 
creates responsibility: "Placing responsibility directly upon a specific group 
means that a finger can be publicly pointed at a particular man or men who 
are charged with the solution of a particular question.' ' 28 These are the realities 
of government and hence had much more weight in Landis's analysis than pure 
constitutional theory. 
Landis understood the real problem in a way that we now find easy to accept. 
The real problem is standards that are too elaborate. Inaction, not action, is 
the failing of most bureaucrats. 29 Standards offer the incompetent and/or timid 
bureaucrat a place to hide. 30 
Still, he recognized the other side: practical motivations for standardless dele-
gation arise from legislators looking for cover. Congress passes on tough political 
questions to the agencies and thus shields itself with the bodies of bureaucrats. 31 
For this reason, some urge a modified nondelegation doctrine that requires 
legislators to legislate as far as practical and, in any event, forces them to resolve 
all broad policy questions. 32 
Landis seemed to advocate a closer working relationship between the bureau-
cracy and the legislator. He noted that officials would be more courageous if 
their actions were formally affirmed by Congress. 33 Congress, on the other hand, 
would be forced to assume its rightful role on difficult policy questions. He might 
then support the recent call for more legislative involvement in the rulemaking 
34 process. 
C. INDEPENDENT AGENCIES VERSus ExECUTIVE CoNTROL 
Much of the motivation behind the Storrs Lectures was to counteract the 
Brownlow Report from Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Manage-
ment. 35 That report had compared the independent agencies, the "headless 
25. /d. at 51. 
26. /d. at 66. 
27. /d. at 52. 
28. /d. at 28. 
29. /d. at 116. 
30. /d. at 75. 
31. /d. at 56. 
32. jAMES FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN 
GovERNMENT 93-94 (1978). 
33. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 79. 
34. E.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Comment: Rulemaking Ossification-A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 453 (1995); UNIFORM LAw CoMMISSIONERs' MoDEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 
art. III, ch. II (1991). He would probably not have supported the structural reasoning prohibiting 
legislative vetoes. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). He might have been convinced by practical 
arguments, however, such as those presented in, e.g., Harold H. BruiT & Ernest Gellhorn, Congres-
sional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369 (1977). 
35. RtTCHtE, supra note I, at 85-86. 
424 48 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 419 
fourth branch," to the concentration of power by Hitler. The special constitu-
tional status granted agencies had just then been recognized in Humphrey's Execu-
tor. 36 Landis was enthusiastic about the Supreme Court's "judicial recognition" 
of independent agencies. Characteristically, he emphasized its practical impact: 
"The real significance of the Humphrey doctrine lies rather in its endorsement 
of administrative freedom of movement. " 37 
Nonetheless, he found it difficult to articulate the advantages of indepen-
dence. 38 Clearly, it was not just that such agencies were insulated from political 
influence in the traditional sense. To a large extent, it was that independence 
allowed expertise to take hold. Adopting the concept of his day, he advocated 
devices that furthered objectivity in government. 39 Agency policy under indepen-
dence ''achieved a degree of permanence and consistency that they might not 
have possessed had their formulation been too closely identified with the varying 
tempers of changing administrations .... On the other hand, professionalism 
in the nonindependent agencies has suffered on occasion at the hands of political 
superiors. " 40 
D. SEPARATION WITHIN THE AGENCIES 
The AP A sits on the solid foundation of the report of another Roosevelt 
study committee, "The Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on 
Administrative Procedure" (AG Committee Report). 41 Shortly after the report, 
America found itself in a total and all-consuming war. When the war ended, 
we returned to the reform of the administrative process. By that time, the 
"minority" in the AG Committee Report controlled the drafting. 42 They had 
argued against the combination of functions within the agencies. 43 Here, how-
ever, a view much closer to Landis's prevailed, and combination of functions 
was accommodated in the APA. 44 
Landis argued for the combination of functions within single administrative 
decisionmaking bodies. 45 He saw the combination of lawmaking and enforce-
ment as one of the advantages of the administrative process. 46 He recognized, 
36. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
3 7. LANDIS, supra note I, at 115. 
38. !d. at 113. 
39. "[B]y the end of the nineteenth century the administrative process was coming to be under-
stood, in accordance with the scientific ideal of reformers, as one that required trained experts 
who made decisions and otherwise performed their tasks in accordance with autonomous, abstract 
standards." WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE RooTs OF AMERICAN BuREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 125 (1982). 
40. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 113-14. 
41. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's CoMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
(1941) [hereinafter AG CoMMITTEE REPORT]. 
42. Davis & Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 514 (statement of Kenneth C. Davis). 
43. AG CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 41, at 209. 
44. The APA accepted "internal separation." 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1988). 
45. LANDIS, supra note I, at 106. 
46. !d. at 3. This view has been confirmed by a study of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States, 51 Fed. Reg. 46,986 (1986). What we now call "split enforcement," assigning to 
separate agencies the tasks of administration and enforcement and the task of adjudicating, was 
found not to increase fairness but did create other problems. 
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of course, that such combinations offended Anglo-American judicial traditions47 
and created grave dangers. 48 Still, on balance, he urged coordination and as-
serted that its absence was the cause of judicial inadequacy. 49 
II. Administrative Process versus the Judicial Process 
Modern readers must be struck by Landis's low opinion of the courts as 
vehicles to solve modern social problems. Landis points to the failures of the 
judicial process as creating the need for the administrative. 
Although it is dangerous to deal in motives, yet the reasons which prompted a resort 
to the administrative process in the latter area [extended police functions] would seem 
to be reasonably clear. In large measure these reasons sprang from a distrust of the 
ability of the judicial process to make the necessary adjustments in the development 
of both law and regulatory methods as they related to particular industrial problems. 50 
In challenging a nineteenth century article in the Harvard Law Review arguing 
against the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), he wrote: 
''These comments ... indicate a singular unawareness of the fact that the chief 
drive for the resort to the administrative process in the field of railroad regulation 
arose from a recognition that the remedies that the courts could provide were 
insufficient to make effective the policies that were being demanded.' ' 51 
His view of the competence of the courts may fail today on substantive grounds 
because the movement to dismantle our unique version of the administrative 
state seems a rejection of the "policies ... being demanded." Yet, a free market 
needs some institutions to enforce rights (even negotiated rights). More to the 
point, the market's necessary conditions, e.g., competition and some informa-
tion symmetry, need a degree of "extended police functions. " 52 Today, as in 
1938, policymakers should ask whether the courts can carry the load. 
The current movements in the law make important a review of the observa-
tions of one who was just coming out of a system we are moving back into. 
Why did he think the courts inadequate to the task and to what extent do those 
arguments inform our modern reforms? The judicial defects, for Landis, were 
both procedural and substantive. His view of the courts' value is moderated 
in his discussion of judicial review. 
A. SuPERIORITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss 
Landis observed several advantages the administrative process might possess 
over the judicial process. Of these advantages, flexibility in design, active partici-
pation, and specialization seem dominant. 
47. LANDIS, supra note I, at 90-93. He recognized that the first tenet of "natural justice" (the 
nonconstitutional due process concept of British law) is an impartial decision maker. WILLIAM WADE 
& CHRISTOPHER fORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 471 (1994). 
48. LANDIS, supra note I, at 95. 
49. !d. at 109, 110. 
50. !d. at 30. 
51. !d. at 89 (referring to I HARV. L. REv. 99 (1887)). 
52. In reality, some level of distributional justice has become a necessary condition for a success-
ful market economy. The passive judicial process seems equally ill-equipped to assure that particular 
type of "justice." 
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Flexibility in design is one of the great advantages of the administrative pro-
cess. 53 The administrative process accommodates specially designed deci-
sionmaking bodies. Even in adjudication, administrative process often deviates 
from the Anglo-American procedural norm. This offends traditional lawyers 
even today and did so then. For example, shortly before these lectures, the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court compared the SEC process to the Star 
Chamber. Whereupon, Justice Cardozo observed: "Historians may find hyper-
bole in the sanguinary simile. " 54 
Equally important and equally contrary to our judicial tradition is the active 
participation of administrative adjudicators. Landis distinguished administrative 
tribunals, even over legislative courts, which" 'passively' adjudicat[e] the merits 
of such conflicting claims as may be presented to it.' ' 55 In showing the advantages 
of the SEC process, he observed: "To have relied, simply, upon such considera-
tions as parties claimant before that agency produced, subjected merely to the 
cross-fire of nonspecialized counsel, would have afforded scant solution.' ' 56 
More than just the courts, however, he questioned the ability of the entire 
judicial process system. "[T]he common-law system left too much in the way 
of the enforcement of claims and interests to private initiative. " 57 Today, the 
increased reliance on "citizen suit" enforcement suggests a finding that private 
claimants now demonstrate the proper initiative. Confused, ad hoc, and ineffi-
cient private enforcement, however, supports Landis's view and calls instead 
for more techniques that foster administrative vigor. 
The third, and perhaps most important, advantage of the administrative pro-
cess was the resort to specialization and expertise. Lawyers tend to be the con-
summate generalists and, hence, value that perspective. They see specialization 
as imposed myopia and expertise as studied bias. Yet, Landis and contemporary 
administrative lawyers took a different view. 
Landis was enthusiastic about the proliferation of single mission agencies. 
Specialized tribunals perforce create a number of focused decisionmaking institu-
tions. Each tribunal will develop expertise and experience. He was, of course, 
aware of continental systems that relied on and continue to rely on specialized 
administrative court systems. 58 
53. He distinguished agencies from tribunals having all the procedural attributes of courts but 
judges distinguished as "legislative" or "administrative" rather than "constitutional" because they 
performed some functions that were not narrowly ''judicial.'' LANDIS, supra note I, at 19-20. 
54. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. I, 33 (1936) (Cardozo, J ., dissenting). Indeed, the "Star Chamber" 
was the kings court and apparently functioned both efficiently and fairly (at least as often as any 
court system.) LAWRENCE BAXTER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 17-27 (1984). Our horror at the mention 
of this tribunal shows one of the advantages of winning: the power to write the history. In fact, a 
similar institution the royal councils evolved in the continent into the councils of state, which in some 
systems, notably the French and the European Union, were found superior to the law courts. 
55. LANDIS, supra note I, at 20. 
56. /d. at 45-46. 
57. /d. at 34. 
58. Examples include the famous French Conseil d'Etat. NEVILLE BROWN &joHN BELL, FRENCH 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (4th ed. 1993). The Germans employ four separate administrative court 
systems also untouched by generalists review. MAHENDRA StNGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw IN 
CoMMON LAw PERSPECTIVE 3, 103 (1985). 
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Landis relied on an often overlooked advantage of specialized administrative 
entities. For Landis, specialization creates, in modern terms, transparency; the 
person responsible for the decision is easily identified and held accountable 59 
Concomitant with specialization is expertise. For Landis, the way out of the 
"paradox" of a free business culture that was nonetheless bent to the public 
benefit (recognizing the unlikelihood of "breeding supermen") was expert bod-
ies that would know an industry well enough to restrain it without damaging 
it. 60 Administrative agencies were created "not merely to maintain ethical levels 
in the economic relations of the members of society, but to provide for the 
efficient functioning of the economic processes of the state.' ' 61 Thus, he saw 
expertise as the motivation behind the administrative state. 
With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant; for the art of 
regulating an industry requires knowledge of the details of its operation, ability to 
shift requirements as the condition of the industry may dictate, the pursuit of energetic 
measures upon the appearance of an emergency, and the power through enforcement 
to realize conclusions as to policy. 62 
While he focused on regulation, these observations seem no less compelling 
in reference to today's social programs, where complex medical, psychological, 
and behavioral questions dominate. 63 Today, we ridicule this enthusiasm for 
expertise. 64 Yet, only Anglo-American lawyers could accept empowering legally 
trained generalists (who rely then on a kind of pidgin science) to make such 
decisions. 
As Landis would himself learn, specialization and expertise could lead as well 
to "capture. " 65 Still, at its best, which is how Landis saw it at the time, an 
agency acting with sensitivity to the realities of its industry is not "captured" 
but is providing the sophisticated regulation demanded of a mixed economy. 6" 
59. LANDIS, supra note I, at 28. 
60. !d. at 25-26. 
61. !d. at 16. 
62. !d. at 23-24. 
63. The famous case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Service, 489 
U.S. 189 ( 1989), provides an illuminating example. That case involved the apparent lack of action 
by the state social service agency on behalf of a boy, Josh, who was seriously injured by child 
abuse. The Court found that the agency was not liable for its failure to act even though it had 
taken on Josh's case. Many have criticized the Supreme Court for rejecting the claim of liability 
against the administrative authority. Yet, the courts and the failures of the judicial process played 
a larger role in josh's circumstances than did any administrative agency. First, a court assigned 
Josh to the custody of his father, who abused him. Second, the processes of another court failed 
to uncover the abuse. The case raises more questions about the competence of the judiciary in 
social program situations than it does about the administrative process. Those who would impose 
liability on officials in such circumstances should be equally as willing to impose liability on judges. 
64. R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 46-47 (1994). 
65. GABRIEL KoLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CoNSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN His-
TORY, 1900-1916 305 (1963); THEODORE Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969). 
66. This view should not be understood to advocate the capture. Robert L. Rabin, Federal 
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1267 (1986). Landis's conduct at the CAB 
belies this interpretation. 
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What appears to be capture, then, is in reality a more sophisticated and informed 
brand of regulation than generalists, courts, or politicians could conceive. 
B. SuBSTANTIVE INADEQUACIES oF THE juDICIAL PRocEss 
Also, substantive passivity, like procedural passivity, argued in Landis's mind 
against assigning modern governmental functions to the judicial process. 67 Lodg-
ing policymaking powers in the courts would thwart programs and result in 
''judicial sterilization.' '68 
Specialization and expertise were important to policy development and hence 
the judicial process was further at a disadvantage. 69 "[C]ertain fields where the 
making of law springs ... from a 'practical' judgment which is based upon 
all the available considerations and which has in mind the most desirable and 
pragmatic method of solving that particular problem. " 70 Indeed, generalist 
judges could not find refuge in "generalizations and principles drawn from the 
majestic authority of textbooks and cases. " 71 
Of course, the courts Landis was writing about were entirely different from 
today's courts. He observed that the growth of the administrative process re-
sulted from "the demands for positive solutions" and "laissez faire ... came 
to an end. " 72 For him, the courts were the drag on this modernization. Now 
we might find Congress and the bureaucracy favoring laissez faire and the courts 
interfering in affairs. Still, a certain conservatism is inherent in the judicial 
system. After all, Landis's judges saw themselves as enforcing fundamental 
rights just as much as modern judges. 73 What our generation sees as advanced 
judicial thinking and commitment to fundamental rights may be viewed as 
insulated and static by the coming generation. 
C. juDICIAL REviEW 
For Landis, judicial review, the melding of the courts into the administrative 
process, was quite another matter. He conceded a significant role for the courts 
in monitoring the administrative efforts. The "ultimate check is, of course, the 
right to judicial review. " 74 
He saw the courts as part of the administrative process. He regretted that 
judicial review was surrounded by an atmosphere of "battle. " 75 Rather, he 
67. For example, the creation of the FTC grew from the lack of judicial policy development. 
"judicial interpretation [of the Sherman Act) suffered not only from inexpertness but more 
from the slowness of that process to attune itself to the demands of the day." LANDIS, supra 
note 1, at 96. 
68. !d. at 97. 
69. Today, we are less convinced of the reality and effectiveness of administrative expertise. 
Nonetheless, to say that the agencies are not as expert as they might be is not to say the courts are. 
70. !d. at 33. 
71. !d. 
72. /d. at 8. 
73. And many modern commentators agree. E.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
74. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 100. 
75. /d. at 136. 
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urged: "[T]he contest should partake more of that rivalry that attends the aca-
demic scene, where a passionate desire for truth makes for recognition and not 
resentment of achievement.' ' 76 
Timely for these lectures was the controversy over review of facts. He found 
quite unacceptable redundant judicial determinations of fact. 77 Even in 1938, 
almost all would have conceded this point. However, de novo review of "juris-
dictional" and "constitutional" facts had been adopted by the Supreme Court. 
Landis objected to anything other than finality for all administrative findings, 
subject to ''review.' ' 78 
He also noted judicial distrust of administrative procedures. "Its bending of 
judicial doctrine and procedure to realistic curvatures tends sometimes to offend 
the courts that supervise its activities. " 79 Of course, he argued against such 
judicial narrowing of the options available to the administrative process. 
On the other hand, he supported a strong sense of judicial authority over 
interpretations of law. 80 "The interesting problem as to the future of judicial 
review over administrative action is the extent to which judges will withdraw, 
not from reviewing findings of fact, but conclusions upon law. " 81 He left no 
doubt that he thought courts should dominate questions of law. 82 
He, like the drafters of the APA, would not have supported the extreme 
readings of the Chevron opinion that has so captivated current legal scholars. 83 
In fact, his contemporaries who drafted the APA made judicial dominance quite 
clear in the statute itself. 84 And not only is the statutory language clear but also 
the legislative history says conclusively: ''This subsection provides that questions 
of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis.' '85 Any 
other view would be quite inconsistent with the allocation of authority between 
the courts and the agencies envisioned by Landis. 
III. The Concept of "Administrative Law" 
It is from allocation of authority between the courts and the "administrative" 
that he derives his definition of "administrative law." "The law the courts 
76. !d. at 153-54. (One must assume he means in the academic dialogue of commentary and 
not the arena of faculty governance.) 
77. !d. at 128. 
78. !d. at 132. 
79. !d. at 49-50. 
80. He supported the distinction between law and facts. !d. at 145. 
81. !d. at 144. 
82. !d. at 152. For the pragmatic reason, like his other observation, that judges are expert in 
interpreting law. Indeed, he observed that able administrators never read statutes. !d. at 75. 
83. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
A strong reading of that language has suggested that it admonishes courts to accept any plausible 
agency interpretation of law. This reading seems inconsistent with well-established law, the opinion 
itself, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions. CHARLES H. KocH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw & 
PRACTICE § 9.18(1)(a) (Supp. 1996). 
84. 5 U.S.C. § 706(A) (1988). (The court shall hold unlawful decisions "not in accordance 
with law."). 
85. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 214, 278 (79th Congress ed., 1946) 
(statement of the reports of both houses is the same). 
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permitted [agencies, tribunals, and rulemaking boards] to make was named 
'administrative law,' so that now the process in all its component parts can be 
appropriately termed the 'administrative process.' " 86 In short, administrative 
law, as it does throughout the world, describes both the substantive law and 
the process for generating and implementing that. Because the substantive ad-
ministrative law has divided into separate legal disciplines, we have come to 
limit the term "administrative law" to the administrative process. 87 Still, admin-
istrative law for Landis was the substantive product of the administrative process 
as supervised by the courts. 
"The ultimate test of the administrative is the policy that it formulates; not 
the fairness as between the parties of the disposition of a controversy on a record 
of their own making. " 88 Hence, a good deal of his discussion of the internal 
administrative process relates to agency policymaking, "administrative law" as 
he would call it. 89 
He recognized that agencies have several techniques for making policy ("exer-
cising interpretative powers'') and that each, properly employed, could contribute 
to the effectiveness and fairness of administrative policymaking. 90 Agencies might 
use rulemaking, adjudication, or seek "additional powers from the legislature. " 91 
He preferred that policymaking be accomplished through rulemaking. 92 Nonethe-
less, he also observed that policymaking was a necessary component of the adjudi-
cative process and the integrity of such policymaking was equally important. 93 
These concepts are self evident in a common law legal culture and well recog-
nized today. Landis, however, identified a failing that remains in our law. He 
noted that "incidence of judicial review over administrative law-making by way 
of rules can be contrasted with the scope of judicial review in cases where the 
law-making of the administrative flows from adjudication.' ' 94 Yet, he observed, 
''the problem seems essentially to have the same core.' ' 95 He urged that adminis-
trative law (agency generated policy) requires the same review whether evolved 
in adjudication or constructed by rulemaking. Today, courts sometimes confuse 
their role when they are faced with policy made in adjudication. As Landis 
recognized, it is essential to the proper allocation of authority between the courts 
86. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 2. 
87. Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Book Reviews, 27 TEx. L. REv. 111 (1948) (reviewing WALTER 
GELLHORN, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1947); E. BLYTHE STASON, THE LAW OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE TRIBUNALS (1947); CARL McfARLAND & ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW (1947)). 
88. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 39. 
89. Today, this "law" would be called "policy" in order to distinguish it from interpretations 
of law. KocH, supra note 83, § 9.15(2)(b). 
90. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 84 ("All have developed empirically in response to the needs of 
administration as those needs were viewed by that particular agency." /d.). 
91. /d. at 41. 
92. /d. at 86. 
93. /d. at 99 ("[A]rbitrarincss and unfairness in adjudication will as easily wreck the regulatory 
controls of the administrative as those same qualities on the rule-making side.'' /d.). 
94. /d. at 149. 
95. /d. at 151. 
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and the agencies that they stay out of policymaking however it emerges and 
concentrate on faithfulness to the law. 
Nowhere is his sense of procedural flexibility stronger than in structuring 
rulemaking. 96 Here, he favored action and concluded that rulemaking should 
be criticized for being too timid rather than too bold. 97 Similarly, he found that 
"too little imagination has been employed in considering the manner in which 
the rule-making power is to be exercised by the administrative. " 98 Today, we 
would attribute such "ossification" largely to overreview, but his comments, 
in an era of a passive judiciary, indicate other causes as well. 99 
Landis had early staked out, and in some sense created, the legal discipline 
of "legislation." 100 In the course of that study, he determined that "preventive" 
legislation was neglected. 101 He saw the administrative process adding this ele-
ment to regulatory programs. In the 1970s, we shifted more toward such legisla-
tion, restraints unrelated to finding of harm or violation. It became the dominant 
administrative process task to evolve and enforce these laws. Great burdens 
were imposed on many who were not acting against the public. For many, 
these became substantial "taxes" that were as inhibiting as direct money taxes. 
Whether heeding Landis or not, this shift to "preventive" regulation fed the 
reaction against government interference. Eventually, even the most enthusiastic 
proponent of the administrate state might accept that this type of administrative 
action has gone too far. 102 Implementation through the administrative process 
has created a new level of hatred for active government and support much of 
today's effort to dismantle it. 
IV. Subsequent Modifications 
His biographer observed that Landis "revised" his view of the "administra-
tive'' in later years. 103 He had two formal opportunities to express his more 
experienced vision. In 1949, he greatly influenced Eisenhower's "Hoover Com-
mission" study through his old friend Joe Kennedy. 104 In 1960, he produced 
another study almost single handedly for his pupil, John Kennedy. 105 
96. !d. at 69. 
97. !d. at 85-86. 
98. !d. at 76. 
99. Many commentators have decried ossification in rulemaking. McGarity suggests that judicial 
review is only one of several reasons. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385 (1992). 
100. RITCHIE, supra note I, at 35-36. 
I 0 I. LANDIS, supra note I, at 90. 
102. E.g., CHARLES ScHULTZE, THE Pusuc UsE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 74 (1977) ("[W]c have 
ended up extending the sphere of detailed governmental control far beyond what is necessary to 
accomplish the objectives we seek."). 
103. RITCHIE, supra note I, at 162. 
104. !d. at 175. The Hoover Report ultimately adopted the "core" of Landis's thinking. THE 
HoovER CoMMISSION REPORT oN 0RCANIZATION oF THE ExEcUTIVE BRANCH oF THE GovERNMENT 
(1949). 
105. jAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960) [here-
inafter THE LANDIS REPORT]. 
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In both studies, he identified defects in the administrative process as it had 
evolved. One must be cautious, however, in interpreting his more recent views 
as demonstrating a new awareness of the defects in the administrative process. 
The studies were assigned the task of improving the existing systems and, hence, 
had a necessarily critical tone. The rudiments of those weaknesses identified in 
the later studies run throughout The Administrative Process. Given those weak-
nesses, in general terms, Landis remained committed to the administrative pro-
cess throughout his life. 
Most interesting, however, was a growing emphasis on personnel and person-
nel management. Rather than "radical surgery," he urged Hoover, " [ t]he real 
solution ... lay in attracting talented personnel and giving them power to carry 
out their tasks. " 106 In his own study, he observed: "The prime key to the 
improvement of the administrative process is the selection of qualified personnel. 
Good men can make poor laws workable; poor men will wreak havoc with good 
laws." 107 While he advocated merit selection and compensation, he urged that 
the key to improvement lay in independence and challenge. 108 
It is tempting to charge Landis, at the writing of The Administrative Process, 
with failing to see that government would not be populated with people like 
himself. Landis, even then, harbored no such illusions: "In the business of 
governing a nation ... we must take into account the fact that government 
will be operated by men of average talent and average ability and we must 
therefore devise our administrative processes with that in mind." 109 Perhaps 
experience taught him either that the average was lower than he contemplated, 
or that this constraint was more important than he thought, or both. 
Nonetheless, it seems his views matured as did those of many of us who 
study human organizations. We all initially concentrate on ordering the deci-
sionmaking process. As we gain experience, we note the importance of the 
people. To some extent, administrative reform has matured in a similar way. 
The Administrative Procedure Act was born of the concentration on process. 
The blue ribbon studies since then, including Landis's, more and more empha-
size personnel. Carter reformed the government personnel systems and the 
"Gore Report" becomes nearly hysterical about the importance of the tech-
niques of personnel management. 110 
Surely, to paraphrase Landis, good people can make any organization work 
and bad people can frustrate the best organization. Selection and recruitment 
are only part of the answer. Better people serve us in the government than we 
recognize. While it is always important to attract the best personnel, it is much 
more important to worry about motivating, trusting, and empowering those 
we have. That is the challenge for reform. 
106. RITCHIE, supra note 1, at 175. 
107. THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 105, at 66. 
108. !d. at 68. 
109. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 87. 
110. Indeed, it devotes one of four chapters to this issue. AL GoRE, THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW, FROM REo TAPE TO RESULTs: CREATING A GovERNMENT THAT WoRKS BETTER & CosTs 
LESS 65-91 ( 1993). 
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V. Assessment 
Today we challenge two principles that guided The Administrative Process: the 
value of government interference and the superiority of the administrative pro-
cess as a decisionmaking concept. In doing so, history becomes important be-
cause it forces us to consider why we chose the road we took. The Administrative 
Process and James Landis form an important part of that history. 
The administrative process contemplated by Landis is not presently in opera-
tion. He reflected on a flexible concept that facilitates careful designs focusing 
on particular decisionmaking tasks. He worked from the foundational principle 
that government should be run as a business. 111 As in the business culture, he 
would have it choose mechanisms designed to further its particular mission of 
serving the public interest, however, the people define that interest. 
Today, we have too much law about the administrative process. The business 
of government, like others, needs serious deregulation. However much govern-
ment we choose, it should be efficient. 112 Unfortunately, efficiency in government 
is condemned by both poles on the social policy spectrum, on one end as im-
moral, and on the other as contributing to an unfortunately active government. 
Hence, the trend towards ossification and sterilization continues. 
This trend, while expansive, is of little account if active government has no 
place in modern society. Landis observed, however, that the government role 
evolved as a natural result of the change in the organization of society. The 
"growing interdependence of individuals in our system" necessarily compelled 
government sponsored coordination. 113 Unless we become somehow an altruistic 
species, we cannot exist in such close proximity without some order and enforced 
cooperation. 114 If that does not come from government, then where? 
111. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 13. 
112. Efficient here means that we get the best government, in terms of services, fairness, sensitivity 
etc., we can from the resources we expend. 
113. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 7. 
114. jERRY MASHAW, BuREAUCRATIC JusTICE: MANAGING SociAL SECURITY DisABILITY CLAIMS 
15 (1983); see also Charles H. Koch, Jr., Cooperative Surplus: The Efficiency Justification for Active 
Government, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 431 (1990). 
